Celem poniższych analiz jest eksplikacja, ujednoznacznienie i przystępne wyłożenie znaczenia pojęcia sprawiedliwość, występującego w pismach Emmanuela Levinasa. Cel to o tyle ważny, że pojęcie to – jak mam nadzieję wykazać – jest jednym z kluczowych pojęć spajających konstrukcję myślową filozofii Levinasa, a sam Levinas – jak z przekonaniem sądzę – jest jednym z ważniejszych myślicieli XX stulecia; nie wspominając już o wadze teoretycznej i politycznej samego tego pojęcia w perspektywie uniwersalnej.

Tekst stanowi krytyczne omówienie książki Jacka Migasińskiego W stronę fenomenologii niezjawiskowej, która jest doskonałym podsumowaniem współpracy polsko-francuskiej i realizuje jedną z najistotniejszych jej funkcji, czyli owocny dialog między badaczami z różnych krajów. Recenzowana książka jest kompetentnym komentarzem do tego, co dzieje się w fenomenologii francuskiej, a jej autor koncentruje się głównie na analizie tekstów Emmanuela Lévinasa i Maurice’a Merleau-Ponty’ego. Na książkę Jacka Migasińskiego składa się jedenaście esejów o rozmaitej fenomenologicznej tematyce: znajdziemy w niej problematykę intersubiektywności, czasu, afektywności i próby (...) budowania dyskursu perfomatywnego w fenomenologii na przykładzie filozofii Lévinasa. Tytułowe określenie „fenomenologia niezjawiskowa” oznacza odsłonięcie najgłębszych źródeł sensu władającego każdym z penetrowanych obszarów i obalenie dualizmów panujących w klasycznym myśleniu, ale także transgresyjność fenomenologii i jej skłonność do nadmiaru. To właśnie ta metoda, polegająca na testowaniu granic i na wykraczaniu poza nie w procedurze przelicytowywania tego, co może być źródłem fenomenów, wyznacza kierunek, w jakim według Migasińskiego zmierza dziś fenomenologia francuska. (shrink)

Considering the urgency of addressing grand challenges that affect human health and achieving the ambitious health targets set by the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, the role of business in improving health has become critical. Yet, our systematic review of the business–health literature reveals that business research focuses primarily on occupational health and safety, health care organizations, and health regulations. To embrace the health externalities generated by business activities, we propose that future research should investigate the conditions under which business (...) articulates and participates in health challenges, engages in multilevel actions toward tackling health challenges, and improves health outcomes and its impact on the health of external stakeholders, including customers and local communities. We also urge business scholars to engage with the public health research community to increase impact. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 5 6.

This article analyzes the adoption of voluntary environmental management programs by firms operating in Mexico. Mexican firms can obtain national certification (Clean Industry) and/or international certification (ISO 14001). Based on institutional entrepreneurship theory, we posit that the role played by first movers as institutional entrepreneurs is crucial if these programs are to become established with sufficient strength and appeal. This understanding is especially important in an environment where more than one program can be adopted. We tested several hypotheses on the (...) behaviors of 1328 facilities operating in Mexico, half of which (664) had certified environmental management programs. Of the 664 certified facilities, 217 were classified as early adopters. Three variables predicted the likelihood of a facility being an early adopter: (1) connected to international market, (2) in the maquila sector, and (3) linked to an industry association that offers free resources. (shrink)

Despite significant advances in neurotechnology, the development of assistive devices often fails to take into account the nuanced needs and preferences of its disabled users into the design proces...

Stanley Cavell (1926–2018) jest jednym z tych filozofów, którzy świadomie wychodząc od założenia wzajemnego dopełniania się filozofii i literatury, rozwijają swą refleksję teoretyczną na przecięciu obu tych dziedzin, traktując ową refleksję jako formę pisarstwa. W opinii Cavella literatura w niczym nie ustępuje poznawczo filozofii w kategoriach wartości poznawczych. Cavell posuwa się nawet do zakwestionowania zasadności sztywnego, nieprzezwyciężalnego podziału na te dwie dziedziny, zaś własne pisarstwo określa mianem krytyki epistemicznej, będącej swego rodzaju krytyką literacką. Choć sam wywodzi się ze szkoły analitycznej, (...) Cavell pozostaje niezwykle krytyczny wobec tej tradycji filozofowania, zarzucając jej, jak sam to ujmuje, „zapomnienie o ludzkim głosie”, utratę kontaktu z rzeczywistością, jak również wyalienowanie się z życia – ostatecznie nazywając filozofię analityczną „dyscypliną najbardziej obcą życiu i pisaniu”. Równocześnie sam zwraca się ku tradycji kontynentalnej, próbując połączyć te dwie odmienne tradycje intelektualne w ramach własnej refleksji filozoficznej. Tak oto Cavell sytuuje się na skrzyżowaniu rozmaitych obszarów i nurtów intelektualnych, zaś jego pole badawcze jest niezwykle szerokie i zróżnicowane – obejmuje filozofię, literaturę, film, teatr i muzykę. W niniejszym artykule zamierzam skupić się na kilku wybranych aspektach dzieła Cavella, nadal nie do końca rozpoznanych w ramach poświęconych mu studiów – takich jak użytek z pojęć filozoficznych oraz wybrane metody, wykorzystywane przez Cavella do interpretacji tekstów literackich, jak problem parafraz, metoda literalizacji języka (w kontekście Cavellowskiej analizy _Końcówki _Becketta), problem dzieła otwartego, zagadnienie zwyczajności związane z Cavellowską wersją filozofii języka potocznego (w kontekście wybranych cech filozofii Wittgensteina). Pod koniec tekstu kilka uwag poświęcam również hermeneutyce Cavella i sugeruję kontekst, w jakim można ją powiązać z innymi nurtami filozofii, zwłaszcza z filozofią Innego, wypracowaną przez Emmanuela Levinasa. (shrink)

This study analyzes the adoption and performance implications of two certified management standards in Mexico. Basing our predictions on strategic balance theory we find that those firms seeking for higher levels of differentiation or legitimacy show inferior environmental performance that firms demonstrating higher strategic balance.

Since the death of Cézanne in 1906, there has been throughout the world of European art a general reawakening of a sense of the necessity for constructive qualities in painting. Whereas our fathers were content to speak of the “composition” of a picture, in our own day it is more usual to speak of its construction. Composition, after all, is a comparatively loose and elastic term implying a generally harmonious arrangement of the massed effect of light and dark, a juxtaposition (...) of contrasting and balanced tones, sufficiently logical in their placing as to give a general sense of repose and unity to the work as a whole. Composition was generally understood to be dependent upon instinct and good taste on the part of the painter, and, as such, it was looked upon as a thing that could not be taught by rule of thumb. Like a sense of colour, a student either had it or he had not; and, beyond attempting to guard him from glaring error, there was little that a teacher of art could do for him in this department of his training. Perspective, which is governed by definite mathematical rules, could be taught in detail as an aid to composition, but the sense of composition itself must be allowed to develop in the student according to his talent for this side of his work. Composition classes were indeed a part of his curriculum, but the criticism which a student received at such classes amounted, in practice, to little more than general advice, given by the teacher, from his ripe experience and his developed sense oftherightandwrong in this matter, to the unmatured taste of the student. It was understood that composition could not exist without a general sense of order, but it was understood in a much looser sense than is implied by the comparatively modern use of the word “construction” that has replaced it. The artist of the modern school or schools of thought will have none of the old happy-golucky, loose thinking in the matter of construction. (shrink)

W artykule przedstawiono etyczny aspekt idei wolności, jednej z głównych koncepcji filozofii Józefa Tischnera. Krakowski filozof w swej twórczości pierwotnie ukazywał wolność w horyzoncie etyki ufundowanej na doświadczeniu apelu wartości przedmiotowych i ich hierarchii – zaczerpniętej od Maksa Schelera. Następnie, pod wpływem twórczości Emmanuela Lévinasa, wzbogacił swa koncepcje wolności o doświadczenie „mowy” twarzy inne- go. Tym samym w jego filozofii zarysowało się napięcie miedzy dwoma paradygmatami myślowymi: fenomenologia wartości i filozofia dialogu. Ostatecznie można pogodzisz powyższe paradygmaty. Takowa synteza ukazuje (...) specyfikę i nowatorstwo idei wolności tworzonej przez Józefa Tischnera. (shrink)

Emmanuel Lévinas’s Figure of the Third This text aims to describe and analyse a figure of the third used by Emmanuel Lévinas in the three phases of the evolution of his concept. I interpret the term included in the title on an anthropological ground by analysing the transformations of terms: il y a and illeite, which I define as the third. On a social level, I explore the terms used by the French philosopher: troisieme homme and le tiers, defining them (...) collectively as the third party. The basic thesis argued in the paper is the claim, absent in the Polish-language source literature, that Lévinas is most of all a philosopher of the third. I claim that the figure of the third is the starting point of the formation of subjectivity, defines the evolution of concepts and conditions metaphysics. On the socio-political level, the third defines the positive justification of society, influences the reformulation of the question of responsibility, and through this, in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, makes it possible to formulate an answer to the doubts related to the unlimited responsibility for the other versus the question of violence in the context of the ethical relation. I also propose a different interpretation from the popular one of the evolution of the concept as a search for a positive justification of social relations. (shrink)

Zagadnienie prawdy jest jednym z podstawowych problemów filozoficznych, poruszanych przez A. N. Whiteheada w Adventures of Ideas. Zanim w niniejszym artykule skoncentrujemy się na problemie prawdy w tym dziele, omówimy kilka podstawowych terminów filozofii Whiteheada niezbędnych do zrozumienia jego koncepcji prawdy. Podstawowym pojęciem w whiteheadowskiej wizji świata jest aktualne zdarzenia. Aktualne zdarzenia autor Przygód idei nazywa także aktualnymi bytami. Aktualne zdarzenie stanowi najmniejsze jednostki rzeczywistości. Ich statut jest zbliżony do zdarzeń czasowoprzestrzennych. Zdarzenia tworzą ciągi. Powiązane ze sobą ciągi zdarzeń (...) mogą tworzyć zjawiska w sensie fizycznym. Aktualne zdarzenia są jakby elementami struktury rzeczywistości, której konstytutywna cech jest proces stawania się. Proces ten jest twórczym rozwojem dziki zasadzie kreatywności, która umożliwia pojawienie się w rzeczywistości nowych zdarzeń, albo ciągów aktualnych zdarzeń. Proces kreatywnego rozwoju rzeczywistości, według Whiteheada, nie powinien być utożsamiany z wariabilizmem Heraklita. Albowiem jego racjonalność jest zapewniona przez tzw. obiekty ponadczasowe, które gwarantują racjonalność procesu powstającej struktury otaczającego nas świata. Obiekty ponadczasowe determinują zakres możliwości ewolucji ciągów zdarzeń i są one potencjalnościami odpowiedzialnymi za determinowanie kierunków rozwoju rzeczywistości. Według Whiteheada zdarzenia i zjawiska zmiennego świata partycypują w obiektach ponadczasowych. Powiazania zachodzące pomiędzy aktualnymi zdarzeniami, obiektami ponadczasowymi i podmiotem poznającym są określone za pomocą pojecia odczucia i ujęcia. Ujęcie polega na powiazaniu konkretnego, aktualnego zdarzenia ze zdarzeniami, które wystąpiły w przeszłości. Ukazuje ono także powiazanie danego zdarzenia z wariantami ewolucji rzeczywistości w przyszłości, która jest określana przez obiekty ponadczasowe. Innymi słowy ujęcia są jakby wektorami ukazującymi kierunki procesu kształtowania się struktury rzeczywistości. Pojęcie odczucia odzwierciedla możliwość włączenia nowych danych do struktury bytu aktualnego lub podmiotu. (shrink)

Lévinas presents atheism as the original good condition of the soul before acknowledging or rejecting God. Such description is closely linked to the notion of separation. Man is a created being, but a separated one, self-contained, though not absolute. Even if not causa sui, he may exist on his own. The description is radically different from that by Augustine, who refers to creation as the participation of man in God. Similarly, there is an almost literal contradiction between the statement by (...) Lévinas and the words of Tertullian, claiming that the soul is Christian by nature. A comparison of Levinas’ text with the theology of Karl Rahner also points to significant differences. Rahner presents the awareness of God as a transcendental, unthematic experience. Lévinas also states that the awareness of God is unthematic, however, he does not share Rahner’s description of the experience of God as the primary transcendental experience. According to Lévinas, God comes from outside through the face of the Other. Levinas’ analyses seem highly interesting for fundamental theology and the theology of spirituality. (shrink)

Gatchel, R. H. The evolution of the concept.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and rationality.--Green, T. F. Indoctrination and beliefs.--Kilpatrick, W. H. Indoctrination and respect for persons.--Atkinson, R. F. Indoctrination and moral education.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and doctrines.--Moore, W. Indoctrination and democratic method.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and freedom.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and religion.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination and intentions.--Crittenden, B. S. Indoctrination as mis-education.--Snook, I. A. Indoctrination and moral responsibility.--Gregory, I. M. M. and Woods, R. G. Indoctrination: inculcating doctrines.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination without doctrines?

A long‐standing debate in the study of human communication centers on the degree to which communicators tune their communicative signals (e.g., speech, gestures) for specific addressees, as opposed to taking a neutral or egocentric perspective. This tuning, called recipient design, is known to occur under special conditions (e.g., when errors in communication need to be corrected), but several researchers have argued that it is not an intrinsic feature of human communication, because that would be computationally too demanding. In this study, (...) we contribute to this debate by studying a simple communicative behavior, communicative pointing, under conditions of successful (error‐free) communication. Using an information‐theoretic measure, called legibility, we present evidence of recipient design in communicative pointing. The legibility effect is present early in the movement, suggesting that it is an intrinsic part of the communicative plan. Moreover, it is reliable only from the viewpoint of the addressee, suggesting that the motor plan is tuned to the addressee. These findings suggest that recipient design is an intrinsic feature of human communication. (shrink)

In this work, we propose a meaningful extension of description logics for non-monotonic reasoning. We introduce \, a logic allowing for the representation of and reasoning about both typical class-membership and typical instances of a relation. We propose a preferential semantics for \ in terms of partially-ordered DL interpretations which intuitively captures the notions of typicality we are interested in. We define a tableau-based algorithm for checking \ knowledge-base consistency that always terminates and we show that it is sound and (...) complete w.r.t. our preferential semantics. The general framework we here propose can serve as the foundation for further exploration of non-monotonic reasoning in description logics and similarly structured logics. (shrink)

With the discovery in 1995 of the first planet orbiting another star, we know that planets are not unique to our own Solar System. For centuries, humanity has wondered whether we are alone in the Universe. We are now finally one step closer to knowing the answer. The quest for exoplanets is an exciting one, because it holds the possibility that one day we might find life elsewhere in the Universe, born in the light of another sun. Written from the (...) perspective of one of the pioneers of this scientific adventure, this exciting account describes the development of the modern observing technique that has enabled astronomers to find so many planets orbiting around other stars. It reveals the wealth of new planets that have now been discovered outside our Solar System, and what this means in terms of finding other life in the Universe. (shrink)

Abstract: Many astrologers attribute a successful birth-chart reading to what they call intuition or psychic ability,where the birth chart acts like a crystal ball. As in shamanism,they relate consciousness to a transcendent reality that,if true, might require are-assessment of present biological theories of consciousness.In Western countries roughly 1 person in 10,000 is practising or seriously studying astrology, so their total number is substantial. Many tests of astrologers have been made since the 1950s but only recently has a coherent review been (...) possible. A large-scale test of persons born less than five minutes apart found no hint of the similarities predicted by astrology. Meta-analysis of more than forty controlled studies suggests that astrologers are unable to perform significantly better than chance even on the more basic tasks such as predicting extraversion. More specifically,astrologers who claim to use psychic ability perform no better than those who do not. The possibility that astrology might be relevant to consciousness and psi is not denied, but such influences, if they exist in astrology,would seem to be very weak or very rare. -/- . (shrink)

The integration of digital phenotyping in psychiatry promises unprecedented insights into mental health, particularly in college settings where mental well-being is a growing concern. The COVID-19...

The paper aims to understand whether morphology can be framed as a language for aesthetics. In particular, whether Olaf Breidbach’s contribution can determine its fundamental terms. These are related to the notion of forms and images. Hence, the paper is structured into three parts: i) framing of research on morphology in Ger-many; ii) analysis of Goethe’s method and vocabulary from an aesthetic standpoint; iii) presentation of Breidbach’s proposal in relation to Goethe.

The Sense of I: Conceptualizing Subjectivity: In Indian Philosophy (Sāṃkhya-Yoga) This book discusses the sense of I as it is captured in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition – one of the oldest currents of Indian philosophy, dating back to as early as the 7th c. BCE. The author offers her reinterpretation of the Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā complemented with several commentaries, including the writings of Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya – a charismatic scholar-monk believed to have re-established the Sāṃkhya-Yoga lineage in the early 20th century. The (...) textual analysis of the classical Sanskrit sources and their constructive interpretation is enhanced by some crucial questions and points of dispute commonly picked up in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as the challenge of ontological and categorical reductionism, the criteria of personal identity, the limits of agency and free will, the ineluctability of self-deception, etc. However, defining the sense of ego (ahaṃkāra) and ‘I-am-ness’ (asmitā) is the main focus of this research. Four chapters composing the study are subsequently devoted to: (1) the methodological assumptions of the present author and the basic historical distinctions relevant to the subject matter, (2) linguistic preconditioning of I-consciousness as well as metaphysical coherency and ambiguity of the concept of subjectivity presented by Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers, (3) cognitive and ontological issues concerning the embodied ego being opposed to inactive and contentless consciousness, or the pure self (puruṣa), (4) axiological evaluation of self-discipline and significance of liberation from ego. 1. The method, scope, and problem. In the first chapter, the method of comparative philosophy adopted in this book is introduced by a phenomenological analysis of ‘otherness’ and ‘alienness’ inspired by the considerations of Bernhard Waldenfels and his understanding of xenology. This section is followed by a critical reflection on the incommensurability of the alternative conceptual frameworks, supported by some arguments provided by Ludwik Fleck and Richard E. Nisbett. When explaining the term ‘comparative philosophy’, the author pays special attention to those proponents of the aforementioned current who contributed to the rapprochement of Western and Indian philosophical traditions by tracing both their similarities and divergences. The author makes references to numerous prominent researchers, such as Paul Masson-Oursel, Paul Deussen, Stanisław Schayer, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Bimal K. Matilal, Raimundo Panikkar, Daya Krishna, Wilhelm Halbfass, and many others representing a younger generation. The historical introduction presents a concise survey of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga textual tradition, and distinguishes five phases of its development: proto-Sāṃkhya (7th c. BCA – 1st c. CE), pre-classical phase (1st – 5th c. CE), classical Sāṃkhya (3rd – 9th c. CE), post-classical phase (till 14th c.), and neo-classical phase (since 1927). Here, the author also evaluates the primary sources, including Sanskrit commentaries, and the secondary sources in the light of their relevance and usefulness to the constructive interpretation of Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā. Then, she makes some methodological remarks concerning the specificity of their reading. This section is concluded with highlighting three main strategies usually applied when interpreting Patañjali’s sūtras: (1) anti-philosophical approach – treating the text as a merely mystical report or the yogic vademecum, (2) anti-mystical perspective – which reads the text as a highly speculative divagation of no much use to a practitioner, (3) mystic-and- philosophical approach – emphasizing the fact that the theory of consciousness presented in Yogasūtra is both philosophically coherent and empirically (or mystically) verified. The author argues for the third, heuristic, perspective mentioned above. The last section of the first chapter aims to problematize the I-concept (aham) and the paradoxical situation of the ego searching for self-knowledge. This part starts with the acknowledgement of the deliberation on non-self (anātman) by Śāntideva, a Buddhist philosopher claiming that one’s own ego ought to be identified with the ego of any other. Then, the author unfolds the fundamental assumptions and scope of the constructive interpretation she wants to develop following K.C. Bhattacharyya’s clues. When explaining her reasons, she stresses both the need to reveal the philosophical meaning of the source materials and, at the same time, the need to make them meaningful on the ground of our contemporary philosophical enquiry. Thus, among the main purposes there is a reliable, scrupulous and careful reconstruction of the historical conception of the self as elaborated on in the classical period of Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, as well as reinterpretation of the sense of I as it was grasped by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinkers in terms of modern comparative and ‘polylogical’ discourse. 2. Naming I. In the second chapter, a variety of linguistic categories capturing different aspects of subjectivity is discussed in detail. A textual examination is preceded by clarification of the semantic distinctions made by Patañjali, such as a verbal convention (saṃketa) which stands for uniting or overlapping a word (śabda), its meaning (artha) and a mental state of comprehension (pratyaya) that ascribes the word to a particular object. Among the key concepts there is also explained a spontaneous mental activity referring to pseudo-objects posited only by words (vikalpa), which is unwittingly involved in every process of conceptualizing, designating, and naming objects. Such mental states can neither be ‘valid’ nor ‘invalid’, and are believed to unavoidably accompany one’s use of language. These presuppositions testify to Patañjali’s severe criticism towards all verbal conventions that not only affect the way we formulate and construct our views, but also determine the very process of perception. A major section of the chapter contains the analysis of the ambiguous sense of subjectivity and its basic aspects distinguished by the author in the result of a contextual and comparative study of the Sanskrit terms used in Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā for naming I-consciousness. The six basic aspects of the self comprise: essentializing oneself, perceiving (something), getting conscious (of something), mastering or owning (something), and being capable of self-identifying as well as disidentifying oneself. A majority of the enumerated predicates ascribed to the self refer to different functions and activities of the empirical ego and the embodied mind. Yet, apart from this intentional, active, reactive, sensing, and objectifiable self Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers distinguish a sense of subjectivity going beyond all these psycho-physical characteristics: the self that remains unmanifest, non-active, free from experiencing any joy or pain, said to be the principle of consciousness. The plausibility of its existence as the final cause of the world is to be determined by the embodied ego by virtue of abductive reasoning based on the analysis of all material and psycho-physical phenomena preconditioned by three guṇas that compose the domain of nature (prakṛti). In the subsequent section, three Sanskrit notions – ahaṃkāra, asmitā, and puruṣa, most significant for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga understanding of subjectivity, are discussed closely one after another to expose their semantic, epistemic and metaphysical connotations. The chapter is completed by some pivotal remarks bringing out the problem of discrepancy between the metaphysical position implied by Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the grammatical instruments applied by them to express it. 3. Cognizing I. The third chapter addresses two important issues in the phenomenology of self-perception, namely the question of psycho-physical dualism explained on the grounds of the considered darśanas, and the spiritual quest for the ideal embodiment of consciousness. While emphasizing the unity of human psycho-physical nature the author refers to several contemporary Western thinkers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Thomas Nagel, John R. Searle, David Chalmers and others, by making some comparative remarks on the idea of the embodied mind. Furthermore, three arguments for the plurality of selves (puruṣa-bahutva) are reconstructed and critically considered. The arguments given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (SK 18) include the diversity of ways in which one experiences one’s life and death, the spatio-temporal distinctness of particular embodied egos, and the variations of features manifested by individual selves. The second section of this chapter presents a thorough inquiry into a non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism defended by the adherents of Sāṃkhya- Yoga. God (īśvara) is defined here primarily as an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for yogic pedagogy. In the concluding part of this section four functions of devotional practice (īśvara-pranidhāna) are recognized and explained; they embrace: (1) prevention from mental scattering and dispersion, (2) therapy allowing to form some positive perceptual habits and the right cognitive approach, (3) enhancement of morally and spiritually required qualities, and (4) reinforcement of the sense of subjective identity being a complementary method of self-development. 4. Liberating oneself from I. The final chapter consists of three sections. The first one introduces the concept of liberation through action (pravṛtti-dharma), commonly opposed in Indian tradition to the path of renunciation (nivṛtti- dharma). According to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya’s interpretation, both Sāṃkhya- Yoga and Buddhism follow the latter one, which in terms of spiritual practice dynamics makes them much closer to each other than it is usually believed. In the subsequent section the idea of liberating oneself from one’s attachment to ego is explained in detail, along with the significance of gradual self-negation. Then the author raises the interpretation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga perspective on liberation as self-distinction-through-renunciation. The main focus in this section is placed on the sense of agency (kartṛ), the problem of free will, and the criteria of moral and soteriological evaluation of one’s deeds. Some crucial questions on karmic conditioning of self-knowledge in the form of kleśas are also the subject of careful analysis. The next section undertakes the issue of ownership (mamakāra) of one’s activity and self-esteem (abhimāna) involved in spiritual growth. Again, some comparative remarks are made by referring to the Buddhist philosophers’ positions, such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. Among others, the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept of eternal, inactive, indifferent, irresponsible, and exclusively conscious self (puruṣa) is quoted and partly rejected in favour of the classical Hindu darśanas. In summary, the author emphasized the significance-generating or sense-creating function of I, its engagement in the search for its own raison d’être, its role in self-identification as well as subverting it, and the expediency of liberation from ego. The philosophers of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga indicate a twofold sense of the self; on the one hand, the only appropriate designation: ‘I’ is true self (puruṣa), a passive and unknowable principle of consciousness whose existence makes the empirical phenomena meaningful. On the other hand, the ‘I’ clearly designates the current sense of the self, expressed as “I think”, “I doubt”, “I suffer”, etc. This second meaning of ‘I’, the specific sense of ‘mineness’, is recognized as a secondary and relative one – thus illusive and troublesome. However, its delusiveness does not mean that the empirical ego is an unreal or non-existent entity. What it implies is that the empirical self-identity is fundamentally inadequate and – according to the Indian thinkers – ought to be unveiled and, ultimately, given up. (shrink)

En una de sus formulaciones más simples, la tesis quineana de la equivalencia empírica entre teorías sostiene que dada una teoría T que dé cuenta del conjunto de observaciones O, es posible que haya otra teoría T* lógicamente incompatible con T, pero empíricamente equivalente, i. e. da cuenta del mismo conjunto O de observaciones. El propósito de este ensayo será el de examinar el impacto de esta tesis frente a la del realismo científico ingenuo, reformulándola en términos más precisos y (...) examinando su plausibilidad. La conclusión será que la tesis de la equivalencia empírica no es una tesis lógico-filosófica como aquellas sobre las que se basa (subdeterminación de las teorías por la experiencia, holismo epistemológico), sino que su carácter es práctico y condiciona sobre las actuales capacidades para observar y testar; también se explotará esta consecuencia para mostrar cómo podría darse cabida a un tipo de realismo a pesar de las tesis quineanas. Se tendrá como referente el artículo de W. V. O. Quine “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World” (1975). (shrink)

Jose Marti contributed greatly to Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain with words as well as revolutionary action. Although he died before the formation of an independent republic, he has since been hailed as a heroic martyr inspiring Cuban republican traditions.

Nietzsche's writings have shaped much contemporary reflection on the relation between philosophy and art. This book brings together a number of distinguished contributors to examine his aesthetic account of the origins and ends of philosophy. They discuss the transformative power which Nietzsche ascribes to aesthetic activity, including his aesthetic justification of existence and its fusion of social and personal existence, and they investigate his experiments with an 'aesthetic politics' and a politicisation of aesthetics. Together their essays set out the ground (...) for future debate about the inter-relation between art, philosophy, and value. (shrink)

In contrast to idealistic denial and Heidegger’s absolutization of death Levinas tries to interpret death on the background of the ethical relation towards fellow men. The boundary which death presents to life he interprets as the experience of passivity of subject in front of the absolute otherness of death. The subject also experiences such passivity in ethical relation towards other people whose otherness and difference nevertheless invert into ethical non-indifference and responsibility of the subject. In this ethical relating Levinas finds (...) the source of meaning, which is alienated from Being, and starting from which he tries to derive new meaning for his own death as well as for the death of my fellow man. (shrink)

Cet article se propose d'expliciter synthétiquement la philosphie d'Emmanuel Lévinas afin de mettre en relief ce qui la distingue de la philosophie de la différence représentée par certains penseurs contemporains français, tels Michael Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida ou Jean-Luc Nancy. Puisque dans le discours de Lévinas on retrouve un certain nombre de concepts et quelques mécanismes philosophiques qui font écho à la philosophie de la différence, on pourrait croire trop facilement que l'œuvre de Lévinas fait partie d'un grand project (...) philosophique englobant le travaux de tous les penseurs de la différence. Or, malgré plusieurs affinités terminologiques et quelques opérations démonstratives rapprochant la position de Lévinas de celle des philosophes de la différence, il serait fautif de les assimiler. Le projet de Lévinas reste profondément ancré dans la tradition juive, tandis que la philosophie de la différence puise surtout dans la tradition philosophique de la Gréce antique où l'on a associé opur la premiére fois la notion de savoir et celle de pouvoir par l'intermédiaire de la métaphore héliocentrique. Pour Lévinas une telle conception du savoir s'accompagne nécessairement de la violence et contourne l'espace éthique qui est – à ses yeux – le seul espace efficace pour la réflexion philosophique. Il élabore dons sa propre philosophie premiére en tant qu'éthique fondamentale faisant appel à des vertus prônées par la théologie judaїque. D'un autre côté, sa critique touche aussi à des tentatives philosophiques récentes de déconstruire la métaphysique traditionnelle occidentale à l'aide de quasi concepts de différence. Par ce double geste critique, Lévinas se distancie non seulement du camp des traditionalistes métaphysiques mais aussi du camp des «réformateurs». Extériorisé dans son individualisme, il ne s'aperçoit même pas qu'il ne peut pas se passer des apports culturels de l'Occident. Par exemple pour critiquer la tradition grecque, il se sert des termes grecs : philosophie, métaphysique, etc. En plus, dans ses constructions ontologiques et axiologiques, il a constamment recours à des schémes philosophiques élaborés par des anciens maîtres à penser d’origine grecque. Sans nuire à la valeur intégrale de son œuvre, les inconséquences et la calques philosophiques de Lévinas nous forcent à nous reposer sincèrement la question difficile de notre «nationalité» philosophique. Cette question – articulée d'ailleurs pour la première fois par Jacques Derrida dans Violence et métaphysique – reste toujours ouverte : «Sommes-nous des Grecs? Sommes-nous des Juifs? Mais qui, nous? [...]». (shrink)

Recognized as a simple communicative behavior, referential pointing is cognitively complex because it invites a communicator to consider an addressee's knowledge. Although we know referential pointing is affected by addressees’ physical location, it remains unclear whether and how communicators’ inferences about addressees’ mental representation of the interaction space influence sensorimotor control of referential pointing. The communicative perspective-taking task requires a communicator to point at one out of multiple referents either to instruct an addressee which one should be selected (communicative, COM) (...) or to predict which one the addressee will select (non-communicative, NCOM), based on either which referents can be seen (Level-1 perspective-taking, PT1) or how the referents were perceived (Level-2 perspective-taking, PT2) by the addressee. Communicators took longer to initiate the movements in PT2 than PT1 trials, and they held their pointing fingers for longer at the referent in COM than NCOM trials. The novel findings of this study pertain to trajectory control of the pointing movements. Increasing both communicative and perspective-taking demands led to longer pointing trajectories, with an under-additive interaction between those two experimental factors. This finding suggests that participants generate communicative behaviors that are as informative as required rather than overly exaggerated displays, by integrating communicative and perspective-taking information hierarchically during sensorimotor control. This observation has consequences for models of human communication. It implies that the format of communicative and perspective-taking knowledge needs to be commensurate with the movement dynamics controlled by the sensorimotor system. (shrink)